In reply to
Daniel J. Bernstein
@djb@mastodon.cr.yp.to
Designing cryptography (deployed now: X25519, Ed25519, ChaCha20, sntrup, Classic McEliece) to proactively reduce risks. Coined phrase "post-quantum" in 2003.
mastodon.cr.yp.to
Daniel J. Bernstein
@djb@mastodon.cr.yp.to
Designing cryptography (deployed now: X25519, Ed25519, ChaCha20, sntrup, Classic McEliece) to proactively reduce risks. Coined phrase "post-quantum" in 2003.
mastodon.cr.yp.to
@djb@mastodon.cr.yp.to
·
5d ago
@paulehoffman@infosec.exchange @rsalz@ioc.exchange Paul, great to see you showing up here!
We're currently discussing Rich's delusion that NSA doesn't attack IETF. On that topic, can you please state for the record how much NSA paid you for your promotion of TLS randomness extensions in IETF (https://web.archive.org/web/20260331174508/https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/08/04/is-extended-random-malicious/) Or are you denying that this happened?
Also, do you dispute https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/checkoway saying that Dual EC becomes thousands of times cheaper to attack whenever those randomness extensions are deployed?
View full thread on mastodon.cr.yp.to
3
1
1
Conversation (1)
Showing 0 of 1 cached locally.
Syncing comments from the remote thread. 1 more reply is still loading.
Loading comments...